

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001528

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014

TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [SU](#) [NI](#) [DARFUR](#)

SUBJECT: OBASANJO TO SEND LETTER ADVOCATING LARGER AU FORCE

REF: STATE 191028

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.5 b AND d.

11. (C) The Ambassador met with President Obasanjo September 5 to deliver Darfur demarche. The Ambassador laid out the proposed draft UNSCR, and provided Obasanjo with a copy of the excerpts (reftel). Obasanjo read the excerpts and said he thought they would work well. He has been pushing for a larger AU troops and monitors deployment in the negotiations, had inserted that into the agenda of the negotiations, and had forced the GOS to accept its being part of the agenda.

12. (C) The Ambassador noted that the USG is considering restricting military air operations over Darfur, in response to repeated attacks or feigned attacks by GOS aircraft. Obasanjo said that seemed both positive and possible. He saw no reason why the AU could not or should not station military observers at GOS airbases, asking how many airbases there were to be observed and how many AU observers were currently available for the mission. He noted that he was trying to get President Bouteflika of Algeria to send 10 more military observers to Darfur, and felt Egypt could contribute more observers too.

13. (C) President Obasanjo agreed to send a letter on September 6 to the President of the UNSC, and also to UNSYG Annan, advocating a larger AU military observers force. He would lay out the humanitarian necessity for such a larger force, and note his personal letter to Sudanese President Bashir along similar lines. He hoped the USG could transmit his letters to the Dutch and the UNSYG in order to save time. (Note: We will forward the text to the Department and USUN upon receipt.)

DARFUR TALKS DYNAMICS

14. (C) Obasanjo said he had met earlier that day with leaders of both the GOS delegation and the rebel delegations. He had told all of them to move on to the next parts of the agenda, and they had reacted positively. That said, Obasanjo felt "there will be a time when we need a club (of sanctions) to move the GOS," especially when the negotiations turn to the third agenda item, political issues. He did not regard greater AU force deployment -- even at GOS airbases -- as sanctions or as a violation of Sudan's sovereignty, noting that the AU Enabling Act allowed AU deployments of troops within African countries as non-foreign forces.

15. (C) Obasanjo and the Ambassador praised FM Adeniji's performance at the talks. Obasanjo said all three Sudanese sides wanted Adeniji to work with them, and the Ambassador noted that all three Sudanese sides liking the same person was a rare occurrence. Adeniji had reported back to Obasanjo that the GOS was emphasizing its sovereignty, but wanted to reach an agreement with the rebels at Abuja. Adeniji would be out of town at the beginning of this week, but would return September 8. Obasanjo mused that he might seek to get Adeniji back to the Abuja negotiations sooner.

16. (C) COMMENT: President Obasanjo's strong commitment and effort have been critical to success at the peace talks. He has been personally involved both directly at the negotiations and behind the scenes, as in his letter to Bashir. He is pulling out all the stops to make the peace talks and the AU deployment work, and exerting pressure on the Sudanese government and both rebel groups to accomplish the same aims we seek.

17. (U) Minimize considered.
CAMPBELL